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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                
NO. 02-2483
                
LEROY EVANS,
Appellant
v.
THOMAS LAVAN; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
OF THE COUNTY OF DELAWARE; THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DELAWARE COUNTY
               
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-03914)
District Judge:  Hon. Charles R. Weiner
               
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 5, 2003
Before:  SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 17, 2003)
                
OPINION OF THE COURT
2SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Leroy Evans appeals from the order of the District Court denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that counsel was ineffective in failing to object
to the prosecutor’s closing argument remarks which allegedly injected racial prejudice into
the case when she asked, referring to defense witness Lorraine Evans, “Was she so
venomous because I was white?”  After review of the record, we cannot conclude that Evans
has satisfied the strict standard required to grant a writ of habeas corpus.
I.
FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Leroy Evans was tried by a jury in a Pennsylvania state court and convicted on
October 21, 1981, of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, burglary,
tampering with evidence and hindering apprehension.  He was sentenced to life in prison
plus 9 to 20 years.  The incident leading to Evans’ conviction involved the robbery and
murder of Emily Leo, a part-time Avon salesperson, whom Evans and co-conspirator
Anthony Jones lured to Jones’ home in Chester on November 11, 1980.  During the
commission of the crime, Evans and Jones choked Leo with a clothesline, beat her with an
iron, and dragged her to a nearby lot.  When Leo temporarily regained consciousness, Jones
threw rocks at her until a passerby saw him and called the police.  Leo died from loss of
blood and massive head trauma one week after the attack.
Police apprehended Jones the day of the incident.  Evans later entered Jones’ house
through a second-story window while police guarded the ground-level doors of the crime
3scene, removed bloody clothes linking Jones to the crime, and destroyed them.  Evans was
charged with burglary and tampering with evidence that day, and, after Jones agreed to plead
guilty and offer testimony against Evans, Evans was also charged with murder, robbery and
conspiracy.  In exchange for Jones’ testimony, prosecutors sought a sentence of life
imprisonment for Jones rather than the death penalty.
Jones’ testimony at trial included the statement that a neighbor, Lorraine Evans (no
relation to Appellant Leroy Evans), saw the two of them exit Jones’ home during the
commission of the crime.  However, the defense brought Lorraine Evans as a witness, and
she testified that she had seen Evans in Jones’ yard while the police were investigating what
had happened that day but, contrary to Jones’ own testimony, she stated she had not seen
Jones and Evans exiting the house.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor observed that
Lorraine Evans was hostile, and asked her why.  Lorraine Evans admitted being hostile, but
attributed her attitude as a response to the hostile treatment she had received from the
prosecutor.
During her closing statement, the prosecutor said the following about Lorraine
Evans, who is African-American:
And then they presented the testimony of Lorraine
Evans – Lorraine Evans, the woman whose demeanor you saw
on the witness stand, a woman who was venomous on the
witness stand and who was hostile not only to the people that
were questioning her but you could see it and you could tell it
in the content of her answers.  Ladies and Gentlemen, was she
so venomous because of what I stood for?  Was she so
venomous because I was white?  Was she so venomous because
she didn’t like cops?
4When Anthony Jones said Lorraine Evans saw him and
Leroy Evans going out that back door does it make sense for
him to name a woman like that who is so hostile to him?
Wouldn’t it, if Anthony Jones were going to fabricate
something, wouldn’t he pick one of the corner kids from the
neighborhood or one of the women that lived in the project
close to his family to say she saw the two of us coming out of
the house and waived [sic] to us?  But he didn’t.  He picked that
rattle snake, Lorraine Evans.
App. II at 38a.  Evans’ defense counsel at trial did not object to these remarks.
In the 22 years since Evans’ conviction, he has filed several unsuccessful challenges
in state court.  His direct appeal to the Superior Court was dismissed on July 3, 1984 for
failure to file an appellate brief.  In 1986, after filing a post-conviction collateral relief
petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”), Evans was granted
the right to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc.  However, Evans never filed the appeal.  Evans
then filed another post-conviction collateral relief petition under the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”), but the state court denied relief.  After several more attempts at
appeal, Evans was granted another opportunity to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, and
Evans filed his appeal on March 26, 1999.  The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of
sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Evans’ request for Allowance of
Appeal.
Evans then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence and raising the following 
issues:  (1) whether the prosecutor improperly injected race into Evans’ criminal trial; (2)
5whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied him procedural due process when it denied
his latest petition for Allowance of Appeal; and (3) whether appellate counsel was
ineffective in drafting the petition for Allowance of Appeal for abandoning four of Evans’
five appellate issues.
On May 13, 2002, the District Court denied Evans’ petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, and granted a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 on issues (1) and
(2).  Issue (3) was dismissed because it had not yet been presented to the state court.
Evans filed this appeal on May 24, 2002, raising only the issue of whether the
prosecutor’s characterization of the defense witness as “venomous” and a “rattlesnake,” as
well as the prosecutor’s attributing possible racial bias to the witness, invited racial bias on
the part of the jury, and thus denied Evans (who himself is African-American) his due
process right to a fair trial.
II.
DISCUSSION
This court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We can
conduct a plenary review of the state court’s decision when the District Court relies
exclusively on the state court record and has not conducted an evidentiary hearing in a
federal habeas appeal.  Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 103 (3d Cir. 2001).  Our review for
a federal habeas corpus appeal is set out in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
6in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  The United States Supreme Court has held that “federal habeas courts
must make as the starting point of their analysis the state courts’ determinations of fact,”
noting that AEDPA “sought to ensure a level of ‘deference to the determinations of state
courts,’ provided those determinations did not conflict with federal law or apply federal law
in an unreasonable way.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000) (citation omitted).
We consider first whether the prosecutor’s comments injected race into the case. 
We have noted that while “courts applying Supreme Court precedent have found that
improper racial and ethnic references can be so prejudicial as to result in a denial of due
process,” not all such references constitute due process violations.  Moore, 255 F.3d at
113-14.  The Supreme Court has recognized that closing statements often involve
improvisation on the part of prosecutors, and, although that does not excuse prosecutorial
misconduct, it “do[es] suggest that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends
an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through
lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging
7interpretations.”  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974).
In reviewing Evans’ appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court did not find
prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor’s question referencing race was isolated
and was related only to the witness’ demeanor, not to the defendant.  App. II at 38a.
Applying the standard set out by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Murphy, 657 A.2d 927, 935 (Pa. 1995), the Superior Court determined that the
prosecutor’s question did not interfere with exculpatory testimony, and it did not “hinder
objective weighing of evidence [nor] impede the rendering of a true verdict.”  App. II at 37a,
40a.
The District Court’s view was similar.  The Court stated,
The evidence, as discussed by the trial court, was based in large
part upon the evidence of Evans’ co-conspirator who described
in detail Evans’ participation in the murder, burglary and
obstruction of the ensuing investigation.  The isolated
comment of the prosecutor during her summation was not
directed to Evans nor to the heart of the Commonwealth’s
evidence.
App. at 8a (Evans v. Lavan, C.A. No. 01-3914 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2002)).
The District Court also suggested that the defense attorney’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s question in her closing statement could have been a strategic decision not to
call attention to the issue, and did not rise to the standard for proving ineffective assistance
of counsel as set out by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).
The Superior Court and District Court opinions are persuasive.  Evans disputes the
8finding that the prosecutor’s reference to race was “isolated,” arguing that the prosecutor’s
lengthy comments about defense witness Lorraine Evans’ hostility culminated in the
question about racial bias.  Evans relies on our opinion in Moore, where we noted that
“[r]acially or ethnically based prosecutorial arguments have no place in our system of
justice” and are only permissible where they are not so prejudicial as to constitute due
process violations.  255 F.3d at 113-14.  But, as the Government points out, the Moore
case is factually distinguishable.  In Moore, the prosecutor based his theory of guilt on the
fact that the African-American male defendant was married to a white woman and thus
would be naturally attracted to the white woman he was accused of raping.  Id. at 99.  The
conviction was reversed on the ground that even curative instructions from the trial judge
could not overcome the prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s statements.  Id. at 118.  In this
case, defense witness Lorraine Evans’ testimony was not so central to either the
Government’s or defense’s theory of guilt or innocence that the prosecutor’s question
about the source of her hostility could infect the trial and subvert due process in the same
way as in Moore.
We thus conclude that the state court opinion did not “result[ ] in a decision that was
contrary to, or involve[ ] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  The court weighed the
evidence in the record and determined that the prosecutor’s statement attacking the
witness’ credibility was not unduly prejudicial.  In addition, there is no misapplication of
“clearly established Federal law” to support Evans’ “secondary effect” argument – that the
prosecutor, by suggesting racial bias on the part of an African-American witness, invites
racial bias on the part of any non-African-American jurors toward Evans, who is also
African-American.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying a writ of
habeas corpus.
                                                    
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Dolores K. Sloviter                
Circuit Judge
